We investigate the impact of banks disclosure on the evolution of their CDS spreads during the European sovereign crisis. The disclosure of information helps investors in building expectations; disclosure may participate into the reduction of the information risk premium and may lead to a decrease of CDS spreads. We analyze the CDS spreads changes following the announcement of sovereign credit rating downgrades. We consider 16 dates in the period 2011-2013 and, for each one, we assess the cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC). We build two disclosure indexes: one general and one specifically dedicated to sovereign exposure. We show that the bank exposure to sovereign risk has a positive impact on the CASC. Disclosure about sovereign exposure has a negative impact on CASC showing that information reduce risk premiums. However, the global disclosure increases the CASC; investors may disapprove the disclosure of too much abundant and broad information.
Introduction
The European sovereign crisis during the early 2010s has raised major concerns about the solvability of European banks. First, the increasing sovereign credit risk has a negative impact on the value of banks portfolio. Furthermore, deeply in debt countries may not bail out banks in financial di culties. As domestic banks are more likely to buy domestic sovereign debt the combined e ect of "no bailing out" and "higher risk" assets can be harmful for the banking sector. At last, the lower value of sovereign bonds -collaterals for ECB facilities -reduced the possibility of refunding and may lead to liquidity problems. For instance, Acharya et al (2015) emphasize these di erent channels of di usion and their negative influence on credit supply. The degradation of banks credit risk conducts to variations in the value of financial assets, e.g. to a decrease in the value of the bonds they issued, and to an increase of the credit default swap (CDS) spread on these bonds (For more details see for instance Hull et al., 2004) . Investors may overreact at the announcement of a sovereign credit risk downgrade, and lead to a too strong adjustment of the bond value or the CDS spread by requiring an informational risk premium, especially when uncertainty is strong. The consequence is a high volatility on financial markets, leading to a higher financial instability. However, this informational risk premium can be reduced if investors are well informed, for instance if the issuer discloses information (see Baumann and Nier, 2004 or Akhigbe and Martin, 2008) . As a consequence, another important issue of the recent years concerns the disclosure of information to investors. Actually, the so-called "subprime crisis" has enlightened the lack of transparency by banks and has led regulation authorities to review the international agreement in order to restore and maintain stability in the banking sector. For this purpose, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA) organized stress tests to prepare banks to extreme scenarios and to help them reacting to emergency situations 1 . The first stress-testing exercise was done in 2009 with 22 participants and none of the results nor the identity of the participants were disclosed.
After that, EBA and the ECB decided to disclose the results and the data used for the two following resilience tests. The second and third stress tests were led in 2010 and 2011, and their results published in the same year. Petrella and Resti (2013) and Bishof and Daske (2013) show that these stress tests actually provided new information to financial markets. To face the sovereign crisis, the EBA also led Capital Exercises, in 2011 and in 2012. Their aim was to review banks sovereign exposure and to control the adequacy of their capital to this risk. The EBA disclosed the results of these exercises in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, disclosure also plays an important role in the banking regulation, as the Basel III Pillar 3 (and Basel II Pillar 3 before it) emphasizes, in order to increase banks resilience (See Frolov, 2007) . The governance codes of the listed firms also require disclosure, for instance with the principles of pay on say or comply or explain. The banks themselves have increased their disclosure towards investors and public, in order to satisfy a growing demand for transparency. The aim of this article is to analyze whether disclosure by banks plays a role in the investors reaction during the European sovereign crisis. We analyze the relationship between disclosure by banks and their credit default swaps (CDS) spreads from 2011 to 2013. We focus on the reaction of CDS spread when the credit rating of a European country has been downgraded. The disclosure of information by the banks should reduce the informational risk premium, and, as a consequence, disclosure should reduce the reaction of the CDS market. We consider two kinds of disclosure: first, we consider disclosure of information about sovereign risk exposure in order to know whether investors more or less react when they have access to such information than when they do not. Second, we consider disclosure of general information (such as corporate governance), because a strategy of global disclosure may create confidence: if investors have access to general information they may react less than if they do not. This question is important from a regulatory point of view: does disclosure increase financial stability? Is disclosure a key of the market discipline on the financial markets? The policy implications are important: If disclosure acts like an enhancer of stability over the CDS spreads, the recommendations and the decisions to increase the mandatory level of disclosure coming from banks have provided beneficial output. We use the data obtained from the European Banking Authority in order to know the banks exposure to sovereign risk: results of the capital exercises in 2011 and 2012 are considered. We assess the impact of downgrading sovereign credit ratings on the evolution of the CDS spreads. We calculate cumulative variations of spread above a CDS index. Then we analyze the role played by banks' disclosure on the CDS spread reactions, when controlling for bank sovereign exposure to the countries included in the EBA capital exercise. We used a ordinary least square model with correction for heteroskedasticity. We show that specific disclosure reduces reactions of the CDS spreads, estimated by the cumulative abnormal CDS spreads changes. Global disclosure has the opposite influence. We also show that banks in the Eurozone are more likely than non-eurozone banks to see their CDS spreads increasing during this period. This article provides several contributions. First, we analyze the role of disclosure by banks when a sovereign downgrading is announced whereas only the impact of disclosure by the EBA has already been analyzed (see Petrella and Resti, 2013, or, in the US context, Neratina et al., 2014) . The role played by the banks as information providers during the EMU crisis has not been analyzed before. Second, we create a new disclosure index based on yearly reports of banks. The index rewards banks that are the most transparent. Third, we use the results of the capital exercises, whereas only the results of the EBA stresstests have been exploited (for instance by Petrella and Resti, 2013 or Ellahie, 2012) . Our last originality comes with the use of the bank CDS instead of equities or bonds, as used by most empirical literature related to disclosure. Actually, a growing financial literature shows the CDS spreads provide relevant information. Hull et al (2004) argue that CDS spreads are more reliable than bonds spreads; Delatte et al (2012) show that during stress periods, information are transmitted from CDS market to bonds market. The article will be divided as follows. The section 2 presents the background, reviewing the existing literature on with our article lies. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and the data set. Statistics about the variables and the downgrading events are given in section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical findings, including robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Background
Our article relies on two fields of literature. The first one is about the link between bank disclosure and financial stability; the second one focuses on the bank resilience during the European crisis.
Bank disclosure and financial stability
A growing literature analyzes the impact of disclosure on financial stability. Most of the literature studies the impact of bank disclosure on stock markets. Baumann and Nier (2004) show that the stock prices volatility is decreased by disclosure. Their results suggest that disclosure is useful to investors because it reduces the rumor e ect and participates into the reduction of unwanted volatility. Akhigbe and Martin (2008) also find a negative relationship between disclosure and volatility. They show that disclosure decreases the individual risk and the total risk even if it has no e ect on the systematic risk 2 . Tadesse (2006) focuses on the impact of the introduction of mandatory disclosure on banking stability. He shows that the quantity and quality of disclosure reduce the probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. The importance of disclosure for bank solvability, and for banking sector stability, has also been emphasized. This aspect can play a role, even indirect, in the perception of bank credit risk by investors. Vauhkonen (2011) shows that information disclosure has a positive impact on bank safety. In a model of banking competition in which the bank probability of continuing its activity depends on the quality of its risk management, mandatory disclosure (e.g. Basel II Pillar 3) fosters bank's quality competition, and avoids behaviors which could be harmful to the financial market stability. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) also study the impact of disclosure on bank risk taking, via the control exerted by depositors. Banks have an incentive to improve the quality of their portfolio and to become less risky when the monitoring of the bank is possible. Informed depositors participate to an increase in stability through the modification of the risk management. Cordella and Yeyati (1998) are more qualified. They show that if banks do not chose the risk of their assets (because of systematic issues for instance), banks disclosure may increase their probability of default. Studying US banks, Neratina et al. (2014) show that the disclosure of the stress-tests results decreases the CDS spreads and, in the long term, reduces the systematic risk: disclosure may lead to a lower risk taking and a lower systemic risk.
2 For more details about the impact of disclosure on financial markets, see for instance Farvaque et al. (2011) .
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Sovereign debt exposure and bank resilience during EMU crisis
A recent literature analyzes the relationship between sovereign risk and banking risk during the recent European sovereign crisis. Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) show that a transmission of sovereign risk to the financial markets (to bonds and stocks of financial firms) starts after the Lehman collapse. A group of articles focuses on the link between sovereign CDS and bank CDS. Arnold (2012) shows that the sovereign risk has a positive impact on banking risk during the first phase of the crisis in 2010. He shows that the more banks are exposed to distressed sovereign debt the more their stock returns and their CDS spreads respond to a change in sovereign CDS rates. However, this reaction appears to be driven by fixed e ects on banks located in the in crisis countries (ICC: Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal). Banks in these countries appear more vulnerable to sovereign risk either directly due to their exposure to domestic debt or indirectly by the impossibility of government to bail them out, increasing the risk of default of bank.
Actually, Acharya et al. (2014) show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked: the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate opening of sovereign CDS spreads, while the banks' one were becoming more and more narrow. After the bailout, however, a significant co-movement between bank CDS spread and sovereign CDS spread is visible. However A second group of articles focuses on the information provided by the stress-tests. Petrella and Resti (2013) analyze the impact of supervisors tests as an information tool on banks stock prices in 2011. The abnormal returns of bank stock prices are strongly correlated to their output, meaning that stress-tests reveal new information. Their results are consistent with Morgan et al. (2014) in an US context: stress-tests provide information on the gap between the required capital and the banks capital, as shown by an event study on stock market. However Ellahie (2012) , in line with microstructure theory, shows that stress-tests in 2010 and 2011 may increase information asymmetry on financial markets. At least Bischof and Daske (2013) 
Testable hypotheses
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether or not disclosure increases stability on the CDS market.
When a sovereign credit risk increases, the consequences are twofold: first, the value of the assets owned by the bank decreases; second the value of the collateral banks can provide to the ECB for a refunding decreases, and may lead to liquidity problems. Thus, banks credit risk may be deteriorated and their CDS spread will increase too 3 . The consequence is greater when the bank is located in the downgraded country, because the ability of the State to bail out banks is reduced. If the investors are rational and well informed, the increase for a bank is proportional to its exposure to sovereign risk. Sovereign debt exposure is supposed to have a positive impact on the CDS spreads. As sovereign risk has an important systematic component (see for instance Longsta at al., 2007) their reaction may also be linked to the exposure to other weakened countries.
A change in the banks' CDS spread is not only explained by a change in the risk premium but also in the informational risk premium. We assume that disclosure has stability e ect over the CDS spreads: More disclosed information reduce the uncertainty, and therefore the informational risk premium. So the disclosure of information reduces the CDS spread of the banks when the signal emitted is able to reassure investors. By disclosing information regularly, a bank can smooth the market reaction to new information. If investors have a good knowledge of bank exposure, their reaction to an announcement of sovereign downgrading will be lower because the informational risk premium will be lower. Thus, we assume that the information disclosed by the bank on its sovereign exposure have a negative impact in the evolution of the CDS spreads. Furthermore, banks can provide other kind of information than the one related to sovereign exposure. These information may have an impact on the investors reaction by creating confidence (Coates, 2007) , and reducing the risk premium. We also assume that global disclosure (not related to sovereign debt) has a negative impact in the reaction of the CDS spreads.
Data and empirical methodology
The following paragraph presents the sample and the dataset. Then, we introduce the 16 events we consider for our analysis. At last, we explain our empirical strategy, and we describe the dependent variables and the independent variables: disclosure by the bank, exposure to sovereign risk and control variables.
Sample and dataset
Our study focuses on the European banks that have participated to the capital exercises in 2011 and 2012, in order to use the information given in their reports: the exposure to sovereign risk and the RWA (risk weighted assets). 79 banks ran the exercise in 2011, and 61 banks in 2012. To have the same sample over the global period, we only consider the 59 banks that ran the exercises both in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, we must focus on the banks with CDS emitted in their name. Our sample contains the 47 banks respecting these three conditions. We also use Bloomberg and Bankscope (from Bureau Van Dijk) databases. The
Bloomberg database provides the CDS spreads. Bankscope provides the accounting data and information about tier one capital. We build banks disclosure indexes on the analyses of their financial reports. The sample contains large international banks such as the Deutsche Bank, which has the largest total asset of our sample (more than 2,655,138 million USD). 
Events: Sovereign credit risk downgrades
We use the Europress.com database to determine the exact date of each downgrade by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. The ratings agencies announced more than 65 sovereign downgrades over the period January 2011 to June 2013 in the European Union. The choice of the period is justified by the fact that the results of the EBA capital exercises are only known since 2011. The di erent rating agencies even announced several downgrades on the same day, reducing the 65 announcements to 56 dates. We consider a restricted number of downgrades in order to focus on the main events. We consider three di erent kinds of event: first when the magnitude of the downgrade is at least equal to three, second when a triple A country is downgraded (even if the magnitude is below 3), and finally when at a single date there is more than one country downgraded. By choosing only the events that have a larger magnitude, we eliminate the downgrades that are considered as adjustments
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. By choosing to incorporate AAA countries that are su ering from a downgrade of their sovereign debt rating, we ensure that we take into account other countries and not only Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Choosing to incorporate the downgrade of France, the United Kingdom or other AAA countries, allows us to analyze sovereign debt that used to be considered as "risk free". The investors can consider the lost of a triple A as important as a downgrade of magnitude 3. We also integrate an event with more than one downgrade on the same day. In January 13th, 2012 S&P downgraded 9 European countries. Those downgrades are the answer from S&P to European policy makers, judging that their initiatives taken in the previous weeks may be insu cient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the Eurozone. The list of events is now up to 16 dates around which we conduct our study. The events we selected cover the following period: From January 1st 2011 and to June 30 2013.
Empirical methodology and variables description
We analyze the evolution of CDS spreads of banks over the period 01/03/2011 to 06/30/2013. Our sample contains 742 observations: 47 banks over 16 events. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal spread change (CASC) of CDS in order to measure the reaction of the market to a downgrading in sovereign credit ratings. For each event, and for each bank, we determine the CASC over di erent windows: from 5 days before the event to 5 days after the event; from 2 days before the event to 2 days after the event.
We also use post event windows: 5 days after the event and 2 days after the event. The choice of several windows allows us to analyze more in details the reaction of the CDS spreads, and to check the robustness of our results (see MacKinlay, 1997 or De Bruyckere, 2012 ). The empirical model estimates the relationship between the CASC and four di erent groups of independent variables (see below). These variables assess the sovereign disclosure (SOVEREIGN DISCLOSURE), the global disclosure (GLOBAL DISCLOSURE), the exposure to sovereign risk (SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE) and control variables (CONTROL). The model we run can be summarized as:
where T is the date of the event and b is the bank, i the number of days we observe the CDS spread before the event and j the number of days we consider the CDS spread after the event. The White's General Heteroskedasticity Test was particularly significant for the global disclosure and for the exposure to Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The model we run is an OLS corrected for heteroskedasticity using a heteroskedasticity -consistent covariance matrix estimator. In a first step, we run an OLS estimation of the model. Then, in a second step, we estimate the error variance by regressing the log of the squared residuals from the OLS on the regressors and their squares. Then in the last step, we run a weighted least squares, using the reciprocal of the estimated variance as weight. We tested the existence of non-linear links between the dependent variables and the independent variables but it was not statistically significant; consequently we only use linear specifications.
Dependent variables
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal variation of the CDS spreads, following the announcement of a downgrade of sovereign credit rating. Following Norden and Weber (2004) , we first assess use the abnormal CDS spread change (ASC). The ASC b,t for the bank b at time t is the di erence between the daily variation of the CDS spread and the daily variation of a CDS market Index (the SNRFIN CDSI GEN 5Y published by iTraxx). The choice of this broad index rather than a European CDS index allows to limit the over representation of the European sovereign debt crisis in the index and reduces the country-specific e ects. Then, we compute a cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC):
where T is the date of the event, b the bank, i the number of days we observe the CDS spread before the event and j the number of days we consider the CDS spread after the event. For each one of the 16 events, and for each bank, we determine the CASC over four di erent windows in the neighborhood of the date of
Disclosure variables
We consider two kinds of disclosure: disclosure about sovereign exposure and global disclosure. give the disclosure index of 2012 till the first quarter of 2013. We build a disclosure index about sovereign exposure with di erent elements. First, we consider the number of times the word "sovereign" is pronounced in each financial report (Times). In order to have a normed indicator, we assess Times by dividing the number of times for each bank by the maximal number provided by a bank (the greatest disclosure).
T imes = time the word sovereign is pronounced b,n max time the word sovereign is pronounced
where b is the bank b and n=2010, 2011.
We also consider the number of pages devoted to sovereign risk (Pages). In order to have a normed indicator, we assess Pages by dividing the number of pages for each bank by the maximal number provided by a bank (the greatest disclosure).
P ages = number of pages dedicated to sovereign exposure b,n max number of pages dedicated to sovereign exposure
We also consider the quality of disclosure devoted to sovereign exposure. Quality is measured by a 100% to 0% scale. In order to obtain the maximum grade, here 100%, the financial report must provide graphical analysis, charts, figures and must be easy to find in the report (typically if the sovereign exposure is easy to find across the summary or the We calculate a sovereign disclosure index (Sovereign Disclosure) that takes into account the three previous components.
Sovereign Disclosure = Mean ( T imes, P ages, Quality)
We build a second disclosure index, Global Disclosure. It integrates several subcomponents, listed in the table 1, concerning the global policy of disclosure by each bank. We consider the size of the financial reports (in pages), the presence or absence of the Basel II Pillar 3 (B2P3) annexes, the presence of information about the remuneration of the decision maker (number of pages devoted to the say on pay), the presence of information about the bank compliance with national or supranational rules of governance (comply or explain), the presence of information about the majority shareholder, the presence of noticeable shareholders (holding more than 3% of the capital) and finally the presence of information about the attendance of board members to meetings. For the two variables based on the number of pages, we transform both variables into dummy variables, equal to 1 if the number of pages is above the median of the sample, 0 otherwise. For the five other variables, we use dummy variables that reward disclosure: for example, if the financial report of a bank gives information about the attendance of boards members to meeting the value of this variable will be 1, and 0 otherwise. Global Disclosure is computed by cumulating the value of each component divided by 7, so its value is between 0 and 1.
Sovereign Disclosure and Global disclosure are expected to have a negative impact on CASC. In the case of the event of 12th, January 2012, we add up the exposure data for each country that were a ected by the di erent downgrades (nine in total). Each of these variables is expected to a ect positively the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes.
Control variables
First, we control whether the bank is located in the country a ected by the downgrade. Greece and Spain, the four countries that benefited from a ECB emergency rescue plan during the period.
These countries are the less able to ensure the bail out process in case of default because of their high level of debt. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the CASCs. We also consider a cross variable measuring the exposure to the ICC sovereign debt when the bank is located in one of those countries: the variable ICCxICC Exposure. At last, to control the risk of the bank, we use the Risk-weighted asset (RWA)
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RWA is expected to have a positive impact on the CASCs. We also consider Non Performing Loans, equal to the percentage of non performing loans in the loans portfolio of a bank. A non performing loan is defined as a sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made his or her schedule payments for at least 90 days. This variable is supposed to have a positive impact over the CASCs. Table 2 reviews descriptive statistics about the CASC around the events, for the four windows we consider.
Statistical analysis 4.1 CASCs statistical analysis
As expected, in average, the CASC is positive: announcements of a downgrading in sovereign credit risk lead to an increase in the CDS spreads. The longer the window is, the higher the CASC is. Two interpretations can be given. First, the investors on the CDS market do not (in average) correct their first reaction after two days (as the means of CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5,+5 are higher than the means of CASC 0,+2 and CASC -2,+2). Second, the investors on the CDS market may anticipate the downgrading, as in average, CASC -5,+5 is higher than CASC 0,+5 and, in average, CASC -2,+2 is higher than CASC 0,+2. The standard deviation is high, revealing heterogeneous reaction of CDS spreads. In order to show the e ect before and after the downgrading, graphs 1, and 2 present the evolution of ASC from 5 days before to 5 days after the announcement. We selected two downgrading. Table 3 
Disclosure variables' analysis
Sovereign exposure analysis
Control variables analysis
On average, only 9,04% of the banks have the same nationality that the downgraded country (Domestic).
Our sample is composed of 37 banks located in Euro-zone member country (EUROZONE); the ten other 
Results and comments
This section first presents the result of our main models. We analyze the impact of disclosure, of sovereign exposure and of control variables. Then, we present robustness checks of our main results.
Disclosure and CDS market reaction
We run two regressions for each of the four windows surrounding the events (Tables 5&6). We consider in the first column the gross exposure to sovereign risk, and we consider in the second column the net exposure to sovereign risk. Sovereign Disclosure has a negative influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes for each of our window and for both net and gross exposure. The results obtained are consistent with our expectation: sovereign disclosure participates into the reduction of the value of CDS spreads. The results are robust on the several windows. They confirm the results of the literature about the role of disclosure in decreasing volatility in financial markets (see Baumann and Nier, 2004 or Akhigbe and Martin, 2008) . On the other hand, Global Disclosure increases the CASCs. Such result shows that investors worship more oriented, specific, disclosure in their calculation of the risk premium. The disclosure of characteristics which are more in line with the current financial and economic situation are more likely to participate to the reduction of the spreads of CDS. Specific disclosure is rewarded by investors in the value of the spread whereas global disclosure, potentially judged vague, increases the spread. This result can also be linked to Ellahie (2012) and the theoretical microstructure literature, showing that disclosure may increase asymmetric information on the financial market, and lead to a higher risk premium. We rerun our main models (over the CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5 ,+5) in order to check if the investors are more sensitive to the quantitative dimension information (number of pages for instance), or, at the contrary, to the qualitative dimension of information (quality of the report for instance). We break up our disclosures indexes in order to separate the quantitative dimension from the qualitative dimension. Results are given in table 7. The stability of our results show that the investors take care about the subject of the disclosed information. They desire and reward both higher quality and higher quantity of disclosure, if the information are about sovereign risk.
Sovereign exposure and CDS market reaction
The analysis of the role played by the banks exposure to sovereign risk provides several results. The total exposure per asset ratio (Relative Exposure) has a significantly positive influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes. The result is consistent with our expectations: the more a bank is implicated in the sovereign debt market the more the increase of its CDS spreads is. Informed investors react to the amount of global exposure to sovereign debt even if it is not directly concern by a downgrade. This result is robust whatever the window is.
Investors also pay attention to the exposure to sovereign debt of countries in crisis. Actually, the ICC exposure has a negative significant influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes. This result is a bit surprising when we expect a bank to see its CDS spread increase more when the bank has a bigger amount of exposure to countries in crisis. It can be explain with the nationality of bank holding sovereign debt of countries in crisis not located in one of those countries. If a strong German bank holds a significant amount of Italian sovereign debt, investors are less afraid of the situation because of the solvability of the German government. In order to confirm the previous result, we see the impact on the evolution of CDS spreads of the cross variable ICCxICC Exposure which is positive and significant. Such result indicates that investors are more likely to revise positively their calculation about the CDS spread when the bank exposed to ICC is located in one of the four countries. This result can be explained by the diminishing capacity of those governments to ensure the stability of their banking sector due to their highly indebted situation. Our results are in line with Arnold (2012) . This article shows that the banks reactions to variations in sovereign CDS spreads were higher when they were more exposed to sovereign risk, especially for banks in ICC. The total exposure to countries that have been downgraded during the period (Downgrade Exposure) has a significant positive influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes, which is consistent with our hypothesis. (This result is robust whatever the window is). This result is important: investors react to announcement of downgrade when banks hold sovereign debt that have been, or will be downgraded. The investors are really sensitive to downgrades, whatever the country a ected by the event. The sovereign risk is perceived as global (in line with Longsta et al, 2007) . This result is consistent with the fact that the net and gross exposure for either short, medium and long term, do not always have a significant impact on
CASCs. It could be interpreted as the fact that the banks are not specifically a ected by one event for a unique country.
More precisely, we observe that the short-term (and less strongly medium-term) exposure to the downgraded country has, in general, a positive impact on the CACS, when the coe cient is significant. Event if this result is not as robust as the others, it is consistent with our expectations: the investors anticipate loss for the bank, a ecting its credit risk. However, the impact of the long-term exposure is negative when the coe cient is significant. This result could mean that investors anticipate a resolution of the European sovereign crisis in the long term.
Nationality, risk of the bank and CDS market reaction
The control variables also provide interesting results. The variable Domestic has a positive influence on the CASCs. Such result indicates that investors react negatively to announcement of downgrade by asking for a greater premium when using CDS for banks located in the downgraded country. The value of the coe cient increases also significantly from 722 for the shortest window (from the announcement to 2 days after) to 3752
for the longest window (from 5 days before the announcement to 5 days after). Investors attach importance to the nationality of the bank and attach even more importance when the window is large at the surrounding of the event. So investors take into account the lower ability of governments in helping their banking sector.
This result is robust whatever the window is. The relationship between ICC and the CDS spread reveals interesting results. The ICC variable has a positive and significant relationship with the evolution of the CDS spreads. This result shows that investors do take into account the nationality of the bank in their calculation of the spread. The fact of being located 22 in one of the four countries in crisis is interpreted as an increase of the probability of default of the bank and can be explained by the diminishing capacity of governments of those countries to ensure the potential bailing out of banks in trouble. The fact that investors take care about the nationality of the bank seems to be confirmed by the positive impact of Eurozone on the CASCs: ceteris paribus, a downgrade influences more the spread of a bank if it is in the Eurozone than if it is not. This result is robust whatever the window is. It tends to show that investors worried about the financial stability of Eurozone and the cohesion of banking system in Eurozone.
Concerning the risk of the bank, the Tier 1 variable's coe cient is generally negative and significant. In average, the higher the Tier 1, the more the CDS spread is reduced when a downgrade happens, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with the recommendations of Basel III capital agreement. Investors tend to reward banks with the highest Tier 1 at the downgrade announcement, as Tier 1 is a source of a bank's financial strength. The RWA is never significant. Such result is interesting in a sense that investors do not react to the RWA and they largely react to Tier 1. The absence of reaction can be interpreted as RWA does not provide enough information to investors. At last, the Non Performing Loans variable does not present a significant influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread change.
Robustness tests
We rerun our main regressions, considering CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5,+5, in order to check the robustness of our results. First, we test the robustness of our results by introducing control variables of macroeconomic stability: the VIX and the CISS. The VIX is the CBOE (Chicago Board Options Exchange) Volatility Index, measuring the market expectations of short-term volatility as they appear in the S&P 500 Index options prices. The VIX reflects the market perception of financial volatility, and can be used as a proxy of macrofinancial stability. The CISS is the Composite Indicator of Systematic Stress elaborated by the ECB. Its aim is to measure the systemic stress present on the financial system. Results are given in table 8. The conclusion of this analysis is that our results do not rely on the macroeconomic stability, as showed by the stability of our results.
The, we rerun the model for two sub-samples: depending on the SIFI (Systemically Important Financial Our results are robust (They are available upon request).
Conclusion
The article provides results on the relationship between disclosure and financial market stability. The results tend to outline some interesting results about the impact of disclosure. We can see that a too broad measure of disclosure, too global, has not the expected e ect and does not participate to the reduction of CDS spreads. This finding is consistent with a large section of the empirical and theoretical literature which advocate for less disclosure (see Coates 2007 for instance). This phenomenon can be also interpreted by the fact that the macroeconomic situation of each of the participating bank was not as stable as it could have been a couple of years before. The global disclosure may not be rewarded during crisis or when there is an unstable perspective but it will require further research to understand more globally the impact of global disclosure on the CDS market. Although, targeted disclosure, information about sovereign risk do decrease the CDS spreads. As mentioned before the literature around disclosure is dual sided about the impact of disclosure on stability. We see in our results a negative correlation between targeted disclosure, here sovereign disclosure, and the evolution of the CDS spreads compared to the evolution of the CDS index in most of the cases. Targeted disclosure is in fact participating to market stability during a period of unstable macroeconomic environment. The results found here also tend to corroborate the critics emitted during the European sovereign debt crisis. It looks like that being a bank located in the Eurozone tend to significantly increase the volatility of the CDS spreads. The recent crisis has proven that the Eurozone has been weakened due to the crisis and so a bank located in one of the countries: the fact of being located in countries in crisis seems to increase the probability of default for those banks. Those banks are holding a large amount of sovereign debts that were getting closer to default after each downgrade: the risk of default was then transferred from the country to the subsequent bank. The contagious e ect found by Arnold (2012) is here verified. Meanwhile, on the other hand the exposure to countries in crisis does not seem to influence positively the CDS volatility. These findings are a key for further researches in two di erent macroeconomics situations: in a growing macroeconomics situation and in another crisis to corroborate the results. It would also be extremely pertinent to develop some theoretical research on the impact of disclosure and the volatility of CDS spreads, in either stable and unstable environment. 
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